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A Different Constitutionality for
Gun Regulation 
by LINDSAY SCHAKENBACH REGELE*
District of Columbia v. Heller hinged on the Second Amendment, 
defining for the first time an individual’s right to own a firearm unconnected 
with militia use, so long as the firearm is in “common use.”1  In announcing 
this right, Justice Scalia applied the precedent set by United States v. Miller,
which suggested that the Second Amendment protects firearms that are 
regularly used for “common defense.”2  This essay argues that because the 
government determined which firearms were in “common use” throughout 
the nation’s early history, the Second Amendment allows regulating the 
types of weapons available to civilians and their usage.  A better 
understanding of the historical regulations that shaped “common use” could 
help guide legislators who wish to enact gun violence prevention measures 
that are consistent with the Second Amendment.
Jurisdictional and scholarly contentiousness around the Second 
Amendment dates to the 1960s, when an increase in gun violence, 
compounded by the assassinations of President John F. Kennedy, Martin 
Luther King, Jr., and Robert Kennedy, provided impetus for the passage of 
the Gun Control Act of 1968.3  Following the original proposal of this 
legislation in 1963, the National Rifle Association lobbied for its defeat4 and 
the American Bar Association Journal published an essay on “The Lost 
Amendment,” which advocated an expanded interpretation of the Second 
Amendment as an individual right.5  Since then, legal scholars, historians, 
       *     Assistant Professor of History, Miami University. 
 1.  554 U.S. 570 (2008).  
 2.  Id. at 621–22 (citing United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939)).  
 3.  Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (1968). 
 4.  Carl T. Bogus, Symposium on the Second Amendment, Fresh Looks: The Politics of 
Second Amendment Scholarship: A Primer, 76 CHI-KENT L. REV. 3, 6 (2000). 
 5.  Robert A. Sprecher, The Lost Amendment, 51. A.B.A. J. 554 (1965).  
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and political commentators have debated whether the Amendment confers 
an individual, collective or civic right.6
The Amendment, which states that, “A well regulated Militia, being 
necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and 
bear Arms, shall not be infringed,” was rarely invoked in the century after 
its passage.  The first court case to address the “right to bear arms” was the 
1822 case of Bliss v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, when a Kentucky court 
ruled that a state law, which fined individuals for carrying concealed arms, 
violated the state constitution.7  Not until 1846 did a court overturn a gun 
regulation based on the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and not 
until 1857 did the Amendment undergo debate in the Supreme Court, when 
the Court observed that if black men were citizens they would have the 
constitutional right to bear arms.8
Until then, Americans’ use of arms for common defense owed less to 
the Second Amendment than it did to Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution, 
which gave Congress the power to support armies and provide arms for the 
militia.9 In accordance with its constitutional obligation, the federal 
government subsidized and improved arms manufacturing and expanded the 
market for guns.10 The Militia Act of 1792 required militia members to 
provide themselves with a musket, but many struggled to arms themselves 
in the face of post-war shortages.11  To redress the shortages, Congress 
prohibited the export of arms, and made their import mostly duty-free during 
the early 1790s.12  It also constructed two federal armories, and began to 
invest in private gun factories to supplement the armories’ output.13
6.  For most of the Amendment’s history, the right to bear arms was considered as a 
collective militia right, rather than an individual one.  See Stuart R. Hays, The Right to Bear Arms, 
A Study in Judicial Misinterpretation, 2 WILL. & MARY L. REV.1959, at 381–406; Sprecher, supra
note 6, at 665–69 (this essay won the 1964 Samuel Pool Weaver Constitutional Law Essay 
Competition). For an overview of the Second Amendment and constitutional law, see Bogus, supra
note 4; Don Higginbotham, The Federalized Militia Debate: A Neglected Aspect of Second 
Amendment Scholarship, 55 WILL. AND MARY Q. 39, 40 (1998).  See also, SAUL CORNELL, A
WELL-REGULATED MILITIA: THE FOUNDING FATHERS AND THE ORIGINS OF GUN CONTROL IN 
AMERICA (2008); MICHAEL WALDMAN, THE SECOND AMENDMENT: A BIOGRAPHY (2015). 
 7.  12 Ky. 90, 94 (1822). 
 8.  See Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243 (1846); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
 9.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.  
 10.  LINDSAY SCHAKENBACH REGELE, MANUFACTURING ADVANTAGE: WAR, THE STATE,
AND THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN INDUSTRY, 1776-1848 (2019).
 11. Militia Act of 1792, ch. 28, 1 Stat. (1792). 
 12.  Andrew Fagal, The Political Economy of War in the Early American Republic, 1774-
1821 (October 14, 2013) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Binghamton University) (on file with 
author).
 13.  REGELE, supra note 10 at 15.  
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An Act of Congress in 1792 gave the president power to select two sites 
for the nation’s federal armories.14  George Washington chose Springfield, 
Massachusetts, and Harpers Ferry, Virginia.15  In 1795, the Springfield 
Armory manufactured the nation’s first public musket, known as the Model 
1795 musket.16  This .69 caliber flintlock was modeled after the French 
Charleville, which many American soldiers fought with during the 
Revolution, and which U.S. officials considered superior to other European 
guns.17  It became the standard U.S. musket until the War of 1812.18
Production was slow at first. Although the Springfield Armory produced 
about 10,000 muskets a year in 1810, in the late 1790s, it manufactured fewer 
than one thousand annually.19  The federal government’s solution was to 
subsidize production in private armories.20
The first step was actually creating a small arms industry.  During the 
American Revolution, the Continental Army had relied on imported arms, 
many of which were in disrepair, and following the war, private producers 
had little incentive to increase output for a limited civilian market.21  What 
gun manufacturing did exist was mostly small-scale craftwork.  Throughout 
the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the most established of these 
gunsmiths worked in Pennsylvania.22  Government intervention, however, 
shifted the loci to the Connecticut River Valley in New England for its 
proximity to the federal armory at Springfield, Massachusetts.23
Additionally, the fact that the region had fewer experienced arms 
manufacturers appealed to government officials, who complained about 
established gunsmiths’ unwillingness to conform to government standards.24
 14.  Derwent Stainthorpe Whittlesey, “The Springfield Armory: A Study in Institutional 
Development,” (1920) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago). 
 15.  Id.
 16.  S. REP. NO. 25, 4TH CONG., MILITARY FORCE, ARSENAL, AND STORES COMMUNICATED 
TO THE SENATE, DECEMBER 15, 1795 (1ST SESS. DEC. 12, 1795); JAMES B. WHISKER, THE UNITED 
STATES ARMORY AT SPRINGFIELD, 1795–1865 19 (1997). 
 17.  John W. Wright, The Rifle in the American Revolution, 29 AM. HIST. REV. 293, (1924).
 18.  WHISKER, supra note 16 at 19. 
 19.  S. REP. NO. 37, 6TH CONG., ARMORY AT SPRINGFIELD, COMMUNICATED TO THE SENATE 
JANUARY 7, 1800 (1st Sess. Jan. 6, 1800). 
 20.  REGELE, supra note 10 at 53.  
 21.  Fagal, supra note 12.  
 22.  See Stephen V. Gramscay, The Craft of the Early American Gunsmith, 6 MET. MUSEUM
ART BULL. 54 (1947).
 23.  FELICIA JOHNSON DEYRUP, ARMS MAKERS OF THE CONNECTICUT VALLEY: A
REGIONAL STUDY OF THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE SMALL ARMS INDUSTRY, 1798–1870
(Smith College Studies 1948).  
 24.  Letter from Oliver Wolcott to Daniel Gilbert (Sept. 8, 1798) (on file with National 
Archives and Record Administration: Post-Revolutionary War Papers, Record Group 45). 
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Beginning in the 1790s, the government contracted with new 
manufacturers seeking to enter the industry.  Eli Whitney, for example, the 
Massachusetts-born inventor and manufacturer, most famous for patenting 
the cotton gin, pivoted to firearms manufacturing when he learned about 
government subsidies.25  He convinced several acquaintances in the 
executive branch that he could successfully manufacture arms if given the 
opportunity.26  Before he even constructed an armory, Whitney received a 
contract for 10,000 muskets, which included a cash advance, and funding for 
several storehouses on his property in New Haven, Connecticut.27  Several 
years later, the Militia Act of 1808 standardized these sorts of contracts, 
which ultimately shaped the development of the arms industry.28  Congress 
appropriated $200,000 annually to arm the state militias, and stipulated that 
these funds go to private manufacturers (the choice of private armories 
reflected many congressmen’s apprehensions about centralizing all national 
arms production at the federal armories).29
For the next three decades, the War Department issued five-year 
renewable contracts that came with ten to twenty percent cash advances, as 
well as a slate of requirements.30  All gun parts had to conform to federal 
standards and pass regular inspections.  Following the war, ordnance 
officials asked the superintendent at the Springfield Armory to figure out the 
“best means to be devised and adopted for bringing the manufacture of arms 
to a uniform standard and pattern in all of their parts.”31  They requested that, 
“muskets given out as patterns from the armories be strictly alike . . . in order 
that the conditions of the contracts now entered into by this department be 
made conformably thereto.”32  The Ordnance Department mandated that all 
contract arms be examined by a government proof-master, who would verify 
 25.  See generally James V. Joy, Jr., Eli Whitney’s Contracts for Muskets, 8 PUB. CONTRACT 
L.J. 140 (1976). 
 26.  Oliver Wolcott to Eli Whitney, October 9, and October 17, 1798, Box 1, Folder 13, Eli 
Whitney Papers, Yale University Manuscripts and Archives. 
 27.  Letter from Henry Dearborn to Eli Whitney (Feb. 25, 1803) (on file with National 
Archives and Record Administration, Records Group 7); Letter from Oliver Wolcott to Daniel 
Gilbert, supra note 26.  
 28.  Eli Whitney to Samuel Dexter January 8, 1801, Box 1, Folder 17, Eli Whitney Papers, 
Yale University Manuscripts and Archives. 
 29.  Militia Act of 1808, ch. 55, 1 Stat. 490 (1808).  
 30.  Fagal, supra note 12.  
 31.  John Morton to Roswell Lee, November 14, 1817, Box 1, Target #2, Letters Received 
from Officials and Officers of the War and Treasury Departments, Box 1, Target #3, Records of 
the Springfield Armory, MA, Record Group 156, Entry1362, NM-59, 94-066; National Archives 
Building, Waltham, Mass. 
 32.  Letter from John Morton to Roswell Lee (Nov. 14, 1817) (on file with the Springfield 
Armory, Mass, Record Group 156, Entry 1362, NM-59, 94-066); 
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that all “contractors’ arms be equal to those produced at the national 
armories.”33  Contractors had little choice but to conform because, according 
to arms contractor Asa Waters, “if the patronage of the government is not 
continued, our factories will be worth but little.”34
Government patronage required significant management and oversight.  
The first head of the Ordnance Department, Decius Wadsworth, established 
a coordinated set of standards for the federal armories and its arms 
contractors.35  He designed a timeline for achieving weapon uniformity, 
requiring the national armories to produce pattern muskets by 1815 and 
begin full-scale production of the “Model 1816” the following year.36
Eventually, all armories machine-produced identical gun parts, a 
manufacturing characteristic known as “interchangeability,” but this was a 
slow and uneven process.37  Historians of technology have demonstrated that 
a factory needed to produce at least 1,000 guns to make interchangeable parts 
production worthwhile.38  In the early nineteenth century, only the federal 
government was willing and able to devote the resources to this.  Private 
makers frequently modified the models they made, which made 
interchangeability impractical.39  Their civilian consumers had little desire 
for interchangeable guns because they were unlikely to have multiple 
identical guns from which to scavenge parts.  Soldiers, on the other hand, 
needed to be able to change and repair defective parts quickly in the field.40
Members of Congress recognized their obligation to contribute to this 
 33.  Letter from John Morton to Roswell Lee (March 4, 1818), Box 1, Target #2; Letter from 
George Bomford to Roswell Lee, June 1, 1823, Box 2, SA-LRO. 
 34.  Memorial of Private Contractors to U.S. Congress, 1835?, Waters Family, Papers, 1749-
1873, BoxW1, Folder 4 1835, AAS. 
 35.  Merritt Roe Smith, Army Ordnance and the ‘American System’ of Manufacturing, 1815-
1861, in MILITARY ENTERPRISE AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE: PERSPECTIVES ON THE 
AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 53 (Merritt Roe Smith, ed. 1985). 
 36.  The Springfield Armory complied successfully with this order, Harper’s Ferry did not.  
See, Smith, supra note 35. 
 37.  Older studies of small arms manufacturing offer exhaustive details about private and 
public gun production in early America, MERRITT ROE SMITH, HARPERS FERRY ARMORY AND THE 
NEW TECHNOLOGY: THE CHALLENGE OF CHANGE (1977).  See also DEYRUP, supra note 23; 
WHISKER, supra note 16; JAMES B. WHISKER & KEVIN SPIKER, THE ARMS MAKERS OF 
MASSACHUSETTS, 1610–1900 (2012).
 38.  Joshua L. Rosenbloom, Anglo-American Technological Differences in Small Arms 
Manufacturing, 23 J. OF INTERDISCIPLINARY HISTORY 683, 691 (1993).  Also, U.S. troops used 
rifles and muskets, which were less precise and so could more easily be made by interchangeable 
manufacture. Robert A. Howard, Interchangeable Parts Reexamined: The Private Sector of the 
American Arms Industry on the Eve of the Civil War, 19 TECH. AND CULTURE 633, 649 (1978).
 39.  Howard, supra note 39, at 645. 
 40.  Howard, supra note 39, at 634, 646–48 (arguing that private arms makers were more 
responsible for innovation in interchangeable production than the federal armories). 
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objective.  In his argument for the reestablishment of the Ordnance 
Department as an independent bureau, Representative Wiley Thompson of 
Georgia noted that, “unparalleled gallantry would become an easy prey to a 
well equipped and well disciplined foe,” if using weapons of “a variety of 
calibres.”41  Thompson’s statement suggests that firearms management was 
a cooperative, rather than oppositional, undertaking between government 
officials and private producers, such as Whitney’s armory, in the nineteenth 
century. 
The federal government not only subsidized and standardized the 
construction of firearms, it also regulated their safety.  In the 1830s, as 
Congress reevaluated the balance between private and public production for 
the military, lawmakers asked military officers to conduct a series of 
experiments to compare the safety and effectiveness of firearms 
manufactured at both the federal armories and those of private contractors.42
During the first round of tests in 1837, the officers preferred the standard 
U.S. musket and decided there was “risk to the national safety by adopting 
new inventions without being convinced of their superiority.”43  The 
government would not agree to purchase weapons from new contractors 
without testing them first.  This had ramifications for the origins of gun 
companies that supply arms in “common use” today.  Samuel Colt, for 
example, solicited government patronage in the 1830s, and had to adapt to 
safety standards when a board of ordnance officers expressed concern that 
several features of new revolvers caused safety risks, namely “the possibility 
of two or more chambers going off at the same time” and the “deafening 
sharpness . . . which must injure the hearing of those who use them.”44  Once 
Colt improved the revolvers, the U.S. military purchased them for use on the 
frontier and in the Mexican American War (1846–1848).45
The sum total of this government regulation and subsidization 
determined what was in the market, and thus what firearms were in “common 
 41.  UNITED STATES CONGRESS, REPORTS OF COMMITTEES OF THE HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES FOR THE THIRD SESSION OF THE FORTY-SECOND CONGRESS 125 (1873).
 42.  S. REP. NO. 743, 25TH CONG., REP. OF THE PRESIDENT OF A BOARD OF OFFICERS ON 
IMPROVEMENTS IN FIRE-ARMS BY HALL, COLT, COCHRAN, LEAVITT, AND BARON HACKETT, AS 
COMPARED WITH THE UNITED STATES MUSKET AND THEIR RELATIVE QUALITIES AND 
EFFICIENCY (1st Sess. Oct. 3, 1837). 
 43.  Id.
 44.  S. REP., 26TH CONG., REP. FROM THE SECRETARY OF WAR, TRANSMITTING, THE REPORT 
OF A BOARD OF DRAGOON OFFICERS APPOINTED TO WITNESS AN EXHIBITION OF THE REPEATING 
FIRE-ARMS AND WATER-PROOF AMMUNITION INVENTED BY SAMUEL COLT (2d Sess. Dec. 16, 
1840).
 45.  S. MISC. DOC. NO. 3, 30TH CONG., PETITION OF SAMUEL COLT, PRAYING A CONTRACT 
FOR SUPPLYING THE GOVERNMENT WITH AN ADDITIONAL NUMBER OF HIS REPEATING FIRE-ARMS,
(2d Sess. Dec. 12, 1848). 
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use.”  In Gunning America, Pamela Haag argues that civilian consumption 
of firearms was limited until arms makers employed strategic sales and 
marketing to create a civilian market for guns in the second half of the 
nineteenth century.46  Samuel Colt, who became one of the most iconic 
patent arms makers of the mid nineteenth century, claimed that prior to the 
Mexican American War, there did not exist a civilian market for revolvers.47
Once the civilian market expanded, the guns that were produced and 
purchased reflected the influence of government intervention.  In the 1850s 
Colt included battlefield testimony in advertisements, which helped him 
reach a larger civilian market.48  One of Colt’s first print advertisements from 
the early 1850s depicted scenes from the Mexican American war, and an 
advertisement from 1858 advertisements harkened back to their being “the 
first rifle fired” in Florida in 1837.49  His success selling to civilians 
increased throughout the 1850s: in 1851, he employed 300 workers and 
produced 40,000 revolvers a year and by 1854, 500 workers, and 50,000 
revolvers.50 During the 1850s firearms produced for the civilian market by 
private arms makers began to exceed those produced by the government for 
the first time.51 Arms makers owed their newfound profitability, however, to 
early federal patronage. 
Today, supporters of an absolute individual right to bear arms cite 
Heller’s reference to arms in “common use” as an argument against 
government interference with the firearms market.  They look to gun 
company sales to determine what arms consumers commonly purchase, and 
argue that such arms are in “common use” and cannot be restricted.52  For 
the nation’s first one hundred years, however, the guns that were in “common 
 46.  PAMELA HAAG, THE GUNNING OF AMERICA: BUSINESS AND THE MAKING OF AMERICAN
GUN CULTURE 58–59 (2016). 
 47.  See generally Colt v. Massachusetts Arms Co., 6 F. Cas. 161 (1851). 
 48.  HARTFORD COURANT, Jan. 20, 1849, at 10. 
 49.  Richard A. Dillio, Samuel Colt’s Peacemaker: The Advertising that Scared the West, 
(Dec. 9, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://www.scribd.com/document/126270948/Samuel-
Colt-s-Peacemaker-The-Advertising-that-Scared-the-West. 
 50.  BARBARA M. TUCKER & KENNETH H. TUCKER, JR., INDUSTRIALIZING ANTEBELLUM 
AMERICA: THE RISE OF MANUFACTURING ENTREPRENEURS IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC 70 (2008).
 51.  Howard supports his argument about civilian markets by citing the 400,000 firearms 
produced by Colt and Sharps between 1851 and 1860, versus the 218,493 produced by the federal 
armories.  This evidence obscures the fact that both manufacturers also sold their arms to federal 
troops on the frontier, but indeed, the civilian market for firearms grew in the decade following the 
Mexican American War.  Howard, supra note 39, at 634.
 52.  See, e.g., Brief of Appellant at 24, 44, Peña v. Lindley, 898 F.3d 969 (9th Cir. 2018) (No. 
15-15449) (arguing that California’s handgun design safety regulations violate the Second 
Amendment by prohibiting handguns in “common use,” and claiming that “it is the regulatory 
environment that must accommodate itself to the choices made by the lawful, constitutionally 
protected market for arms, and not the other way around”).  
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use” were determined by federal subsidization and regulation.  We must 
consider these historical origins of “common-use,” as well as the fact that 
some of the biggest gun companies today—Colt’s Manufacturing Company 
LLC (Hartford, Conn.), Smith and Wesson (Springfield, Mass.), and Sturm, 
Ruger & Co., Inc., (Southport, Conn.)—have their roots in armories where 
the government played an essential role in shaping arms development.53
As lawmakers face opposition when they attempt to regulate guns 
favored by the industry, we need to reevaluate policy aims based on true 
historical precedent.  It is not historically sound for policymakers to allow 
gun manufacturers and marketers to determine what arms are in common 
use.  By fully understanding the historical relationship between the firearms 
industry and the government, lawmakers could assert their prerogative to 
intervene with gun safety regulations.  Armed with historical knowledge, 
sensible gun control might be seen as both constitutionally and politically 
sound. 
 53.  Kari Huus, The Biggest Gun Companies in the Market, MONEY TALKS NEWS
(Feb. 27, 2018), https://www.moneytalksnews.com/slideshows/the-biggest-gun-companies-in-the-
u-s-market/?all. 
